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Abstract
How does ethnic politics affect the state’s ability to provide policing services?
Using a panel of administrative personnel data on the full careers of 6,784
police officers, we show how the rise of ethnic politics around Kenya’s inde-
pendence influenced policemen’s behavior. We find a significant deterioration
in discipline after Kenya’s first multiparty election for those police officers of
ethnic groups associated with the ruling party. These effects are driven by a
behavioral change among these policemen. We find no evidence of favoritism
within the police. Instead, our results are consistent with co-ethnic officers
experiencing an emboldenment effect. Our findings highlight that the state’s
security apparatus, at its most granular level, is not insulated from ethnic
politics.
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The efficient provision of public goods relies on a well-functioning public service,
yet many developing countries lack an efficient public sector. For instance, many
authors documented widespread absenteeism in the health and education sectors
(World Bank, 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012; Callen
et al., 2016), despite the fact that public sector positions are often well-paid and
highly prized.1 Finan, Olken and Pande (2017) emphasize three aspects that are
key to understand the behavior of public servants: selection, incentive structures,
and monitoring. Our paper highlights a fourth factor: political institutions which
can encroach on the day-to-day behavior of public servants.
In this paper we use original data obtained from administrative personnel records
that allow us to track 6,784 Kenyan police officers over their entire career. These
records track the offenses committed by each police officer on duty, including inci-
dents of absenteeism, untidiness, drunkenness, disobedience, and violence.2 We use
these data to study the period 1957-1970 and investigate how the rise of ethnic pol-
itics affected the performance of policemen. Our results show that quickly following
the first multi-party elections in 1961 and rising ethnic politics in Kenya, police
officers from ethnic groups that were part of the dominant Kenya African National
Union (KANU) party started to behave significantly worse.
Figure 1 visualizes this striking pattern, by comparing offense probabilities for
policemen whose ethnicities were represented in the dominant KANU party, with
those of ethnic groups in opposition and out of power. In the analysis that fol-
lows, we investigate the channels that underly this pattern, scrutinizing the aspects
that the literature put forward as key channels (selection, incentive structures, and
monitoring).
We establish three key results. First, the increase in misconduct is driven by a
change in behavior from policemen rather than personnel selection. We also find no
evidence that changes in work assignments to particular police divisions might have
caused these increases. Second, the effect is strongest for objective offenses, such as
absenteeism and drunkenness, but weak for more subjective offenses, such as disobe-
1Finan, Olken and Pande (2017) estimate that public sector workers in Kenya, Malawi, Niger,
Nigeria and Tanzania earn more than double the average wage in the private sector. Even when
taking into account differences in occupational structures of the two sectors, a premium of about
20% remains.
2Administrative data collected by bureaucracies themselves are rarely used in empirical work
(Pepinsky, Pierskalla and Sacks, 2017).
2
Figure 1: Misconduct by ethnic groups associated with the ruling party (KANU)
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Notes: This figure plots the offense rate of police officers in a given year, split by whether the
ethnic group of the police officer was affilitated with the Kenya African National Union (KANU).
That is the Gema (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru) alliance throughout, the Luo until 1965, and the
Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) after 1964. The year 1961 marks Kenya’s
first multiparty election.
dience. This fact suggests that the change in offence rates does not merely reflect
discriminatory reporting. The context in which the original data were generated, as
well as the evidence on potential mechanisms, are inconsistent with systematic mis-
reporting. Third, we test whether favoritism distorted incentives. We confirm that
policemen with a history of misconduct were less likely to be promoted and more
likely to be dismissed. However, KANU policemen were not treated differently in
this respect. Therefore, the deterioration of behavior is not a response to changing
incentives within the police. Moreover, there is no evidence that KANU policemen
are more willing to resign voluntarily, which suggests that improved outside options
are unlikely to drive their behaviour. However, one explanation consistent with
our results is that ethnic politics created a general sense of empowerment, which
emboldened the policemen of the ruling ethnic groups. Our results show that civil
servants are not insulated from shocks to the political salience of their identities.
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Our paper adds to three important strands of literature. First, we contribute to
a fast-expanding research area that Finan, Olken and Pande (2017) describe as the
“personnel economics of the state.”3 Understanding the determinants of public sec-
tor performance is central to this literature. Existing work on high-level bureaucrats
has emphasized the role of training and career background (Bertrand et al., 2015),
personality traits (Callen et al., 2015), and patronage networks involving politicians
(Iyer and Mani, 2012; Lehne, Shapiro and Vanden Eynde, 2017; Nath, 2016; Xu,
2016). Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) study how advertised work conditions for
bureaucratic posts affect the pool of applicants. However, the literature has paid
little attention to how ethnic politics shapes the behavior of public servants. More-
over, researchers rarely have access to complete personnel records of “street-level
bureaucrats”, using the terminology of Lipsky (1969) – like policemen.4 Relying
on detailed historical data, our paper shows that political shocks can affect the
day-to-day job performance of the state’s rank-and-file.
Second, our work contributes to our understanding of the determinants of police
behavior. Compared to other public sectors, there is also a dearth of work on
police performance, especially in low income countries.5 Nevertheless, protecting
citizens and their property is one of the most fundamental public goods that the
state provides, and one that is ripe for abuse under the wrong conditions (Auerbach,
2003; World Bank, 2000). One notable exception is Banerjee et al. (2012), who use
an RCT to study the effects of work conditions and monitoring of policemen in
Rajasthan. They find that better training and a freeze on transfers improved police
effectiveness and its public image. Sierra and Titecay (2016) shed light on illicit
rent-sharing agreements between lower and senior ranks of the traffic police in the
3The police is more complex than other public services. Financially incentivizing easily observ-
able tasks (e.g. arrests made, fines issued) may lead to overzealous and inaccurate enforcement
and crowd out other important but non-incentivized tasks. Moreover, in contrast to the health
and education sectors that are characterized by a common interest of the state and its citizens –
both want public servants (teachers, doctors, nurses) to provide high quality services, there is a
tension between the interest of the government and the citizens at the receiving end of the police
work (the alleged criminals). Recent innovations rest on such common interest by enlisting the
help of citizens (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005).
4Neggers (2017) provides evidence of own-group favoritism of polling officers influencing election
results in India.
5One paper, not set in a developing country context but relevant for our suggested behavioral
mechanism, is Mas (2006). He finds that pay raises below a reference point reduce job performance
in the New Jersey Police.
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DRC. Sharing our focus on ethnic politics in Kenya, Hassan (2017) provides evidence
on how political interference perverted the purpose of the police. She finds that co-
ethnic police officers were strategically placed to swing constituencies in the 1992
and 1997 Kenyan elections. Our paper shows that ethnic politics has impacts that
are not limited to the policing of elections. Even without the direct interference of
politicians, ethnic affinities can undermine the effectiveness and discipline of police
officers.
Third, this paper adds to our understanding of the economic costs of ethnic di-
versity. Several studies link ethnic diversity to poor economic growth at the macro
level (Easterly and Levine, 1997; De Luca et al., 2015; Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin and
Wacziarg, 2012; Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). At the local level,
ethnic diversity is typically associated with poor public goods provision (Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007). For Kenya, Miguel and Gugerty
(2005) show that ethnic diversity is associated with worse schooling facilities and
access to water. Burgess et al. (2015) show how Kenyan road building was con-
centrated in the districts that share the same ethnicity as the president in power -
an effect that disappears during democratic times. Similarly, Kramon and Posner
(2016) find positive impacts on education levels for the coethnics of the minister
of education, even in periods of multi-party elections.6 Our paper provides micro-
evidence on how the rise of ethnic politics disrupts the functioning of the state’s
bureaucracy by affecting the performance of its personnel.7 A small number of re-
cent papers uses similarly fine grained outcomes. For example, Shayo and Zussman
(2011, 2017) show that exposure to ethnic conflict increases in-group bias among
Israeli judges. Rasul and Rogger (2015) find that ethnic diversity makes Nigerian
bureaucrats more productive. Focusing on team performance in the context of
Kenyan flower farms, Hjort (2014) shows how ethnic tensions reduce productivity
in ethnically heterogeneous production teams. In contrast, we find that it is not
ethnic diversity in itself, but the political dominance of certain ethnic groups that
drives poor performance. This result could reflect that both the nature of political
shocks (violent ethnic conflict versus increased political power) and the nature of
6Franc¸ois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) qualify these findings by showing that allocation of minister
posts in African governments tends to reflect the population share of ethnic groups.
7Our paper takes differences between ethnic groups or alliances as given. Posner (2004) studies
the conditions under which ethnic cleavages become salient by comparing the same ethnic groups
in the different political environments of Zambia and Malawi.
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the organization (private firms producing in teams versus public service) matter for
the relationship between ethnic politics and job performance.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides
background information on ethnic politics and the police in Kenya. Section II and
III describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section IV presents the results.
Section V studies potential mechanisms, followed by a discussion in section VI.
Section VII briefly discusses external validity. Section VIII concludes.
I Background
A The Rise of Ethnic Politics
Kenya is a multi-ethnic state, made up of more than forty ethnic groups. Prior
to British colonial rule boundaries between the groups were fluid (Parsons, 2012);
centralized political structures were absent and authority was located at the village
level and typically personal, often a function of lineage, age, and wealth rather than
ethnic allegiance (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Lynch, 2011).
The roots of ethnic politics lie in the colonial era. The uneven penetration of
European settlers created stark economic differences between ethnic groups (Ajulu,
2002; Omolo, 2002). At the same time, the colonial administration discouraged the
formation of nation-wide African political activity. Consequentially, ethnic, or at
best provincial, political bodies were created (e.g., the Kikuyu Provincial Associa-
tion), which contributed to the differentiation of ethnicities with distinct political
interests (Sanger and Nottingham, 1964; Omolo, 2002). By 1957, the following po-
litically relevant ethnic divisions had emerged: the Kikuyu (19.7%), which together
with the Meru (5.3%) and Embu (1.2%) form the ethnic coalition called Gema;
the Kalenjin (10.8%), which together with the Maasai (1.9%), Turkana (2.2%), and
Samburu (0.6%) form the ethnic coalition Kamatusa; the Luo (13.8%); the Luhya
(13.1%); and the Kamba (11.2%) (Morgan, 2000; Posner, 2004).
After the defeat of the (Kikuyu-led) Mau Mau uprising in 1956, restrictions on
political activity were relaxed. In the run-up to the first (although under severely
limited franchise) African elections to the legislative council in 1957 the government
allowed the formation of district associations, further nourishing tribalism and giving
birth to majimboism (i.e., regionalism) (Sanger and Nottingham, 1964; Anderson,
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2005). The 1960s marked Kenya’s transition towards independence on 12 Decem-
ber 1963. The years 1960-61 were characterised by the electoral run-up to the first
open, nation-wide, multi-party election that would determine the transition govern-
ment and the constitution. African political parties were fully sanctioned at the
Lancaster House Conference in January 1960. In May 1960 the Kenya African Na-
tional Union (KANU) was formed from existing tribal and provincial organizations.
KANU headed by Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) became an intensely anti-colonial and
nationalist party but drew most of its leadership, membership, and support from the
Gema coalition and the Luo. Fearing Kikuyu and Luo dominance, minority ethnic
groups (the Kamatusa and coastal groups) formed the Kenya African Democratic
Union (KADU) (Ndegwa, 1997). Led by Ronald Ngala (a Mijikenda), KADU advo-
cated majimboism, which would give significant powers to the regions (Ajulu, 2002;
Anderson, 2005). Ethnic rhetoric and antagonism ran high in the campaign, result-
ing in ethnic clashes and displacements in Rift Valley Province (Ajulu, 2002). The
1961 election, which KANU won with 67% of the votes over KADU’s 16%, clearly
illustrated the parties’ relative strength and established Kenyatta as the dominant
post-independence figure (Bennett and Rosberg, 1961; Hartmann, 1999). As Man-
ners (1962) commented there was “little reason to believe the next vote will be very
different.” Indeed when the two parties contested the “independence election” in
1963, KANU won overwhelmingly taking 83 seats against KADU’s 33 in the lower
house and 18 seats against KADU’s 16 in the Senate (Throup, 1993; Hartmann,
1999). Kenyatta became prime minister and later president. In 1964, KADU and
KANU merged (Ndegwa, 1997). As a result, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin and the
vice-president in KADU at the time, became Home Minister and directly responsible
for the police.8
The fusion of KANU and KADU shifted the balance of power in favor of the
conservative elements within KANU, which led to the defection of the left-leaning
wing led by Odinga (a Luo) in 1965, creating a new opposition party, the Kenya Peo-
ple’s Union (KPU). It opposed the perceived growing conservatism and pro-western
orientation of the KANU leadership, which by then was composed exclusively of
8The president and the Home Minister were the two positions in control of the police. Hence,
from 1964 onwards, control of the police was in the hands of the Gema-Kamatusa alliance that
dominated KANU. Other ministerial portfolios, however, were more broadly shared among ethnic
groups at that time (Franc¸ois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015).
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members of the Gema and Kamatusa (Ajulu, 2002). In the subsequent series of
by-elections held in 1966, KANU further expanded its majority in both houses of
parliament. Following the anti-communist logic of the Cold War, the KPU was
banned on national security grounds in 1969, ushering in a more than 20 year pe-
riod of single party rule. Our study covers the last years of colonial rule 1957-1963
and the first years of independence 1963-1970. Figure 2 summarizes the key political
events that mark the inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups to power. These are
the political events we exploit to estimate the impact of ethnic politics on police
performance.
Figure 2: Timeline of Events around Kenya’s Independence
Notes: The figure highlights the key political events that mark the changes in the ethnic power
coalition of KANU.
B Police Organization and Development
The Kenya Police is Kenya’s main law enforcing body. It has always been an
instrument of regime protection. During colonial times, the police answered only
to the Governor. At independence this unchecked concentration of power passed
to the President (Auerbach, 2003). The police is therefore vulnerable to political
influence, which may ultimately affect the performance of its personnel.
During colonial times, British officers hoped to find men of soldierly qualities
and whose loyality could be trusted among the Kamba and Kalenjin (the so-called
“martial races”). In contrast, very few Kikuyus entered the Police Force.9 Only
9In 1956, 22.6%, 21.6% and 3.2% of police officers were Kalenjin, Kamba and Kikuyus, whereas
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after the end of Mau Mau (in 1956) and in anticipation of Kenya’s independence,
a deliberate attempt was made to bring the ethnic composition in line with that of
the population (Clayton, 1989). Around 1960, Police Commissioner Richard Catling
initiated a process of Africanization in the higher ranks (Throup, 1992). Hastily
trained, newly-promoted African officers gradually replaced Asian and European
senior officers.
After Kenyatta took control in 1963, as Prime Minister and then President,
changes in the police followed the same pattern as in the most important ministries
(Hornsby, 2012). Kenyatta relied on ethnic loyalties and alliances. He appointed
Bernard Hinga, an ethnic Kikuyu, as Police Commissioner in 1964 and by 1967 all
but one of its branches and departments were led by an ethnic Kikuyu. Kenyatta
particularly relied on the General Service Unit (GSU). The GSU is a paramilitary
branch of the police, well-equipped and well-trained, and highly political. It was
employed against internal political threats, and specifically formed a counterweight
to the army. Kenyatta shifted the GSU’s officer corps in favor of the Kikuyu,
especially Luo officers had to go. eniority as criterion for promotions (Frazer, 1994,
as cited in N’Diaye, 2002).
The geographical organization followed a fourfold hierarchy with the headquarter
in Nairobi, then police divisions, stations, and finally, police posts that could be as
small as a road block. The Kenya Police was not evenly or equally distributed.
Reflecting longstanding colonial interests, the police was heavily concentrated in
the urban commercial and European residential areas. They also served the “White
Highlands”, where Europeans owned farms. In 1957, as a legacy of Mau Mau, the
police was also well presented in Kikuyu and the bordering Kalenjin areas (Throup,
1992). With the end of violence, however, the number of police posts were reduced
in those areas. The majority of African rural areas in contrast were under-served.10
After independence the policing network expanded, particularly to African areas.
the 1962 Census population put their share at 10.8%, 10.5% and 18.8% respectively (Kenya Police
Annual Reports; Census 1962).
10African reserves were originally policed by the “Administration Police”, which dealt with
offenses against district council by-laws and customary law. The Kenya Police dealt with offenses
against the Penal Code and general legislation (TNA CO1037/41).
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II Data and Measurements
A Collection and Sampling
Our primary data source are the Kenya Police Service Registers. These service
records contain systematic and comprehensive information about a police officer
over the full length of his career. In particular, the service registers recorded per-
sonal details at recruitment (name, ethnicity, height, place of birth and residence),
any training beyond the obligatory six months, names of divisions at which the police
officer served with dates of transfers, any misconducts/commendations and corre-
sponding punishments/rewards, promotions/demotions and particulars of discharge
(date, reason, overall conduct).
These personnel files are from non-active police officers and were sorted out for
destruction in 2009. Awaiting appraisal by the Kenya National Archives the files
were dumped in a depot at the outskirts of Nairobi. The files did not follow any
obvious order and leaks in the roof destroyed a good share of the records. Our sam-
pling strategy was to collect all readable registers of African police officers, with the
exception of police officers of Kamba ethnic origin recruited before 1950, whom we
deliberately undersampled as they were numerous in the Police Force before 1950.11
We checked whether the ethnic composition, the organisational structure (units,
provinces), and the prevalence of dismissals in our sample follow the official statis-
tics reported in the Kenya Police Annual Reports and the Statistical Abstracts. With
the exception of the Kamba before 1950, there is a very strong agreement between
the sources.12 We are therefore confident that our sample is largely representative
of the Kenya Police Force, especially for the time period we focus on. The attained
sampling rate is about 1:4 throughout the 1957-1970 period (see Appendix Figures
A.1 and A.3).13
For our purposes, we bring the data into a police officer - service year panel
structure. Our panel has 6,784 policemen doing their service between 1957 and
11It was easy to identify the year of recruitment as the color of the service registers turned from
blue to red in the 1950s.
12Figures A.2, A.3 and A.4 show these comparisons. The Kamba undersampling is visible in
Figure A.2, while different reporting of ”others” is probably due to differences in categorization of
smaller groups. The administrative data on the ethnic composition ends in 1962.
13Weighting Kamba officers in our sample to correct for undersampling does not change our
main result, see Appendix Table B.7.
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1970.14 We choose 1957 as the starting point of our conduct sample, as it is the
first year after the end of the Mau Mau uprising.15 This sample still includes four
years of data before the 1961 elections that made the KANU party Kenya’s dominant
political force. Our sample stops in 1970, as we do not have any records of policemen
entering service after this year.
B Measurement
For each police officer, we know the dates of entry and exit, family background,
ethnic group,16 education, place of birth, a full promotion record, assignment history,
acts of misconduct, punishment for misconduct, good behavior, training undertaken,
rewards for good performance, and the character assessment on discharge. Among
these variables, the richest information is contained in the conduct and punishment
variables.17 These cover an extremely wide range of misbehavior by policemen,
and are recorded at relatively high frequency and great detail. We observe 11,406
offenses in our sample of 44,689 officer-years. One officer, for example, is reported
to have stolen a “leopard’s skin”. We assign these acts of misconduct to a limited
number of categories. The most common offenses are failure to attend duty and
14Policemen enter our sample after the typical training period of six months, or their “promotion”
from recruit to constable – whichever occurred earlier.
15We do not include the period of the Mau Mau rebellion in the main analysis, because we do
not think that it is a valid baseline to compare the rise of ethnic politics to. Policing tasks were
very different in nature, in particular in regions affected by the conflict (Throup, 1992).
16We code and standardise ethnic groups as follows. We combine Kikuyu, Embu, Meru into
“Gema”. We defined the Kalenjin (any of the subgroups of Cherangani, Keiyo, Kipsigis, Marakwet,
Nandi, Ndorobo, Pokot, Sabaot, Tugen), Maasai, Turkana, Samburu as “Kamatusa”. We then have
the Kamba, Kisii, Kuria, Abaluhya, Luo, Mijikenda and Somali as relevant players. We grouped
all other ethnic groups into one residual category.
17Rules and procedures are laid down in Ordinance No. 79 of 1948 “An Ordinance to Provide
for the Organization, Discipline, Powers and Duties of the Police Force” (subsequent amendments
did not make substantial changes). Oversight of discipline was strictly hierarchical. “Superior
officers” (ranks above assistant superintendent) investigated cases of misconduct and if they found
officers guilty imposed punishments. To an overwhelming degree the Police Force (and our sample)
consisted of “subordinate officers” such as constables, corporals and sergeants. Article 41 lists 44
categories of offenses; Article 43 lists the punishments ranging from reprimands, fines, withdrawal
of efficiency allowances, extra drills, confinement to barracks to demotion. Harsher sentences
including dismissals could be imposed by the Police Commissioner. Officers had the right to
appeal. We do not have information about who provided the evidence or accusation. Many
offenses such as absenteeism and disobedience are internal and would let us assume that evidence
was put forward by higher ranked officers within the police. Veteran police officers confirmed this
in our interviews.
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absence without leave (36%), drunkenness (10%), being dirty (7%), disobedience
(8%), falling asleep on duty (4%), and allowing prisoners to escape (3%). 60%
of policemen commit at least one offense. In the main specifications, we rely on a
binary offense variable, indicating whether an individual has committed any offenses
in a given year. This annual offense probability is around 20%.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables. About 17% of officers were
stationed in regions where their own ethnicity is the largest group (i.e., their ethnic
homelands). About 33% of policemen signed their booklet, whereas the remaining
officers provided just a thumbprint. Formal education is limited, with only about
30% having any formal education. The rank of every policeman is summarized on
a 0 to 3 scale, where 0 corresponds to constables and recruits; 1 to corporals; 2 to
sergeants; and 3 to inspectors and above. The average rank is close to 0. The service
registers also provide a character assessment at discharge, ranging from ”Bad” to
”Exemplary”, which we code on a scale between 0 and 4, where the sample mean is
around 2.
Acts of misconduct can be fined, and conditional on committing an offense the
average fine in our sample is about 16 Kenyan Shilling. Fines are by far the most
common form of punishment, and imposed in 77% of offenses. In another 10% of
cases the offense is punished in another way, for example with drills, hard labour,
suspension, or in extreme cases detention. Not included in this punishment dummy
are mere “reprimands”, which are the only punishment in about 13% of offenses.
III Empirical Strategy
A Identifying the KANU Treatment Effect
Our paper studies how the behavior of policemen changes when their co-ethnics hold
political power. The empirical strategy exploit three shocks to political power: (1)
KANU winning Kenya’s first multi-party elections in 1961, bringing the Luo and
Gema (led by the Kikuyu) to power; (2) KANU absorbing the Kamatusa alliance
(headed by the Kalenjin) in 1964, and (3) the Luo leaving KANU in 1965. As
different groups gain and lose political power at different points in time, our main
treatment varies across time and ethnic groups. Intuitively, our approach amounts
to a difference-in-difference strategy, in which we compare an ethnic group that gains
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard deviation Observations
Police officer’s conduct
Offense (0-1) 0.192 0.394 44,689
Absent (0-1) 0.077 0.267 44,689
Drunk (0-1) 0.024 0.153 44,689
Dirty or untidy (0-1) 0.019 0.135 44,689
Disobedient (0-1) 0.020 0.130 44,689
Serious offense (0-1) 0.021 0.144 44,689
Commendable behavior (0-1) 0.004 0.066 44,689
Number of offenses 0.255 0.604 44,689
Police officer’s ethnic group
Gema (0-1) 0.208 0.406 44,689
Kamatusa (0-1) 0.292 0.454 44,689
Luo (0-1) 0.078 0.268 44,689
KANU (0-1) 0.409 0.492 44,689
Kikuyu (0-1) 0.132 0.338 44,689
Kalenjin (0-1) 0.222 0.415 44,689
Police officer’s ethnic group and characteristics of division where stationed
Stationed in ethnic homeland (0-1) 0.170 0.376 41,449
Stationed in district of birth (0-1) 0.092 0.289 39,653
Share of co-ethnics in division 0.146 0.110 41,449
Share of co-ethnics in higher ranks 0.146 0.148 41,415
Other background characteristics
Literate (signed booklet) (0-1) 0.327 0.469 38,917
Any education (0-1) 0.307 0.461 44,689
Tenure 7.318 5.597 44,689
Rank index (0-3) 0.222 0.538 35,102
Character assessment at discharge (0-4) 2.337 0.993 37,969
Promotion and Punishment
Promotion (0-1) 0.014 0.119 44,689
Dismissal (0-1) 0.243 0.429 44,689
Resignation (0-1) 0.103 0.304 44,689
Fine (Ksh) 16.34 21.91 8,561
Any fine (0-1) 0.767 21.91 8,561
Any punishment (0-1) 0.871 0.334 8,561
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the individual-year panel of 6,784 police
officers serving between 1957 and 1970. The offense variables take value 1 if the policeman was
found guilty of that offense at least once in that year. Serious offense includes fighting, assaults,
theft, discharging a rifle, allowing a prisoner to escape, corruption, and creating a disturbance.
Gema (Kamatusa) is a dummy variable indicating whether the policeman’s ethnic group belongs
to either Kikuyu, Embu, or Meru (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, or Samburu). KANU is a time-
varying dummy variable indicating whether the policeman’s ethnic group was represented in the
KANU party. Stationed in ethnic homeland/home district is a dummy based on the location
of an officer’s division and his ethnicity/ district of birth. Share of an ethnicity in higher ranks
measures the proportion of senior officers (corporal or above) in the division who share the
officer’s ethnicity. Literate is approximated by whether the individual has signed his service
register versus given a thumbprint. Any education refers to attendance of formal schooling.
Tenure measures the number of years in service. The rank index takes the values 0, 1, 2, 3 for
a constable, corporal, sergeant and inspector or above, respectively. Fines and punishment are
conditional on committing an offense. 13
power through KANU to a group that does not, and time periods during which this
group is in power to when it is out of power. As three groups (Gema, Kamatusa,
and the Luo) gain or lose power at three different points in time (1961, 1964, and
1965), we pool three difference-in-difference estimators in our main specification:
Offensei,e,t = β ∗ KANU poweri,e,t + γXi,e,t + δe + λt + i,e,t (1)
The dependent variable is an indicator of whether policeman i, of ethnic group
e, commits an offense in year t.18 For the main results, we rely on a binary offense
measure, for which effects are more precisely estimated than for offense counts.19
KANU poweri,e,t is a dummy equal to one if a policeman’s ethnic group is part of
KANU and holds political power. It is equal to 1 for the Gema from 1961 onwards,
for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964.
In our sample, policemen enter and leave on a rolling basis. Hence, our first spec-
ification does not allow us to identify whether differences in the offense probabilites
of KANU policemen are driven by changing behavior of existing policemen or by
selective entry and exit of policemen. Evidence on behavioral change comes from the
inclusion of individual fixed effects κi in our main specification. The corresponding
specification becomes:
Offensei,e,t = β ∗ KANU poweri,e,t + κi + i,e,t (2)
In this approach, the estimation of β relies on individuals who served during both
regimes: before and while (and/or after) their ethnic group had political power.20
Causal identification of the difference-in-difference coefficient β requires a common
18The first and last calendar years of service can be incomplete. We control for the share of the
year served to account for the mechanical relationship between the time served and the probability
of offending in that year. Main results without this control are reported in Table B.6 and are very
similar.
19The main result by ethnic group for offense counts are reported in Appendix Table B.3.
20It is natural to restrict the analysis to a balanced panel of policemen in this case, even though
the resulting sample of policemen is not randomly selected. In the result tables, we report the
findings of fixed effects models for both the full sample and a balanced panel.
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trend assumption: i.e., in the absence of political changes, KANU policemen would
have followed the same trends as the other ethnic groups. Figure 3 provides evidence
in support of this assumption. It will be corroborated further through a series of
placebo tests in which we will shift the treatment one to three years forward.
To study the mechanisms underlying our main effect β, we can test whether
the treatment effect is stronger for policemen with particular characteristics, like
serving in one’s ethnic homeland, belonging to the dominant ethnic group at the
police division level, rank, and literacy status. We denote such characteristics as
Xi,e,t, and add an interaction term to our main specification:
Offensei,e,t = β ∗ KANU poweri,e,t + φ ∗ KANU poweri,e,t ∗Xi,e,t
+Xi,e,t ∗ λt + γ ∗Xi,e,t ∗KANU ethnice + κi + i,e,t
(3)
φ measures the differential effect of KANU power depending on the level of the
characteristic Xi,e,t. Identification of φ is challenging, because the interaction term
risks picking up general time-varying or ethnicity-specific effects of Xi,e,t. For exam-
ple, Xi,e,t is a dummy for serving in one’s home region, the estimation of φ would
be biased if i) Gema officers generally perform worse in their homeland (even before
KANU holds political power), or ii) police officers regardless their ethnicity perform
increasingly worse in their homeland over time. Therefore, it is important to control
flexibly for heterogenous effects of the characteristics Xi,e,t. Time-varying effects of
Xi,e,t are captured by λt. The coefficient γ captures the time-invariant differential
effect of Xi,e,t for the three ethnic groups that were part of KANU (Luo, Kamatusa,
and Gema, which we indicate with a dummy KANU ethnice).
21 This flexible control
strategy also allows us to test whether these characteristics mediate the treatment
effect. For example, the assignment of particular groups to their homelands could
respond to the treatment. It also helps us to rule out time-varying effects that lead
to violations of the common trend assumption. For example, KANU officers could
be more educated, and educated policemen could become less well-behaved after in-
dependence, regardless of political power. This concern is relevant, because certain
socio-economic differences between ethnic groups existed before 1961.22
21Note that we can only estimate γ for time-varying characteristics Xi,e,t, as time-invariant
characteristics like literacy would be absorbed by the individual fixed effects.
22In Appendix Table B.1 we show that before 1961 KANU officers differed significantly from
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B Reporting concerns
Our reliance on reported rather than independently observed offenses has obvious
limitations. It is conceivable that the recording of offenses for politically powerful
ethnic groups changes even if actual behavior remains unaltered. While we cannot
rule out such a reporting effect a priori, a number of factors support our interpre-
tation of the recorded offenses as a reflection of actual behavior.
1. The registers were kept for internal use only. Interviews with retired police
officers confirmed that record keeping had been accurate and complete.
2. The most senior police officers (who were often European, even after indepen-
dence) had built up their careers during the colonial period, which ensured
consistency in administrative records and reporting practices.
3. Systematic misreporting for particular ethnic groups has to be implemented
by senior officers, but we find no evidence that the ethnic composition of the
senior officer corps matters for the misbehavior we document.
4. One would expect reporting bias in the direction that politically powerful
groups have less recorded offenses for the same behavior. Our findings go in
the opposite direction: KANU policemen have more recorded offenses.
5. There is a certain discretion in how to punish a given offense: fines of varying
amounts, dismissal, or delayed promotion. Punishments offer a more effective
and powerful instrument for ethnic discrimination. However, we do not find a
differential treatment in punishments.
6. We can break down the offenses, and compare results for more objective of-
fenses (like absenteeism and drunkenness), and more subjective offenses. Our
results are strongest for objective offenses. Similarly, we do not find evidence
of differential ”commendable behavior”, which arguably is even more at the
discretion of senior officers.
The results referred to in this list are discussed in detail in subsequent sections.
Taken together, we think our findings are inconsistent with a view that systematic
misreporting generated differential misconduct for KANU policemen.
other ethnic groups.
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IV Main Results
Figure 3 shows the annual offense probability of KANU officers, non-KANU officers,
and the difference together with its 95% confidence interval. It nicely illustrates our
main result. The top left graph shows the pattern for the Gema, the top right for
the Kamatusa, the bottom left for the Luo, and the bottom right for all KANU
(i.e., Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo) officers. The dashed vertical lines separate the
time periods in which an ethnic group holds to power through KANU, from periods
out of power. Between 1957 and the first election in 1961, differences in offense
probability between ethnic groups are statistically indistinguishable from and close
to zero. After the first election, the difference in offense rates in the Gema, Luo and
KANU graphs are greater than zero and the confidence interval includes zero only at
the margin. We see a similar pattern for Kamatusa officers: once KANU absorbed
KADU in 1964, their offense probability increases compared to non-KANU officers.
This difference persists throughout the time period, with the 95% confidence interval
including zero only at the margin. Moreover, we see a reversal of the pattern when an
officer’s ethnic group leaves power: the difference in offense probability between Luo
and non-KANU officers becomes negative and statistically indistinguishable from
zero after 1965. The difference in offense probabilities is substantively meaningful.
While the average offense likelihood of all police officers increases after the first
election, the increase for KANU officers is considerably larger. Between 1961 and
1970 the probability of a non-KANU officer committing at least one offense in a
given year increased from 15% to 21% per year (i.e., a 40% increase), whereas the
likelihood of a KANU officer committing at least one offense in a given year rises
from 15% to 25% (i.e., a 67% increase) during the same time period.
In Table 2, we move beyond the graphical analysis and employ the regression
framework specified in the previous section. KANUpower is a time-varying dummy
variable indicating when officers belong to an ethnic group that is in power through
KANU. Column 1 presents the results from a simple linear probability model includ-
ing only year fixed effects and a control for the share of the year served. Column 2
also includes ethnic fixed effects and Columns 3-5 present the results including indi-
vidual fixed effects on three different samples: the full sample including all officers
serving at any point between 1957 and 1970, the stacked sample including officers
serving continuously throughout at least one of three time windows around each
17
Figure 3: Offense Probability of KANU Groups and Other Ethnicities
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Notes: This figure plots the offense probability of police officers, split by ethnic groups affiliated
versus not affiliated with KANU, and the difference between those groups. The top left graph
focuses on the Gema alliance, which came to power in 1961 and remained in power throughout.
The top right graph focuses on the Kamatusa alliance, which joined KANU in 1964; the bottom
left graph concentrates on the Luo, which were part of KANU between 1961-1965. “Never
KANU” includes officers of ethnic groups that were never part of KANU, that is excluding the
Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo throughout 1957-1970. The graph at the bottom right focuses on
KANU as a whole. “KANU” is a time varying variable including officers of ethnic groups
affiliated with KANU in a given year, and “Non-KANU” includes officers of ethnic groups that
were not part of KANU in that year.
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Table 2: Difference in Offense Probabilities between KANU and Non-KANU Officers
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KANU ethnic 0.002
(0.006)
KANU power 0.038 0.035 0.028 0.033 0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Ethnic Group FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44689 44689 44689 18567 13266
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 2053 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU
on offense probabilities. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense
committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU ethnic is a time invariant
dummy variable taking the value 1 for ethnic groups that were part of KANU
(Luo, Kamatusa, and Gema). KANU power is a time varying variable that
switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for
the Kamatusa after 1964. The ‘full’ panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen
in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The ‘stacked’ panel (Column 4)
takes the union of four balanced panels around each transition: [1958,1968] for
the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the Kamatusa transition
in 1964; and [1964,1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced panel
(Column 5) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968.
All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year
served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
political change change, and the balanced sample including all officers who have
served continuously throughout 1958-1968.
Columns 1-5 confirm the pattern shown in the bottom right graph of Figure 3:
on average a KANU officer is between 2.7 and 3.8 percentage points more likely
to commit an offense than a non-KANU officer in any give year after 1961. This
difference in offense rate is remarkably robust to the inclusion of different fixed effects
and changes to the sample. Most importantly, the individual fixed effects results
in Columns 3-5 indicate that almost all of the difference in offense rate between
KANU and non-KANU officers is due to behavioral changes, i.e. the same officers
peforming worse. This rules out selection mechanisms, such as the entry of less
qualified officers or the existing of the best KANU officers post-independence.23
23Appendix Table B.2 re-estimates Columns 1-3 of Table 2 using the extended time period
1950-1980. The sample in our main analysis stops in 1970 because our data does not include
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Table 3: Placebo Regressions (Full Sample)
Offense
(1) (2) (3)
KANU power 0.028 0.028 0.030
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
KANU power 0.000
(1 year forward) (0.012)
KANU power -0.001
(2 year forward) (0.010)
KANU power 0.003
(3 year forward) (0.010)
Observations 44689 44689 44689
Clusters 6784 6784 6784
Wald Test 0.028 0.028 0.027
KANU power - Placebo (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Notes: This table presents the results from placebo regression models for the
full individual-year panel data of policemen serving between 1957 and 1970. The
dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in
a given year. The placebo terms shift the KANU power variable 1, 2 and 3
years forward. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the
Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964.
Additional placebo results are reported in tables B.4 and B.5. All regressions
include year and individual fixed effects, and control for share of the year served.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Table 3 presents placebo regressions using the full sample as in Table 2, Col-
umn 3.24 Columns 1-3 include a series of temporal placebos for one, two and three
year prior to the first multiparty election in 1961, while Columns 4-6 move the time-
varying KANU power variable forward by one, two and three years respectively. All
placebo interactions are statistically indistinguishable from zero and the vast ma-
jority of them are small compared to the size of the coefficient estimates of interest.
Moreover, the differences between the KANU power variable and the various place-
bos is consistently positive and in most cases significantly different from zero. The
any policemen who entered after 1970. The results are qualitatively similar. Appendix Table B.3
re-estimates Columns 1-5 of Table 2 using the number of offenses committed in a year rather than
our preferred dichotomous measure. Panel A presents the OLS and Panel B the Poisson regression
results. Again, we find that KANU officers are significantly more likely to commit offenses in both
specifications.
24The placebo effects are qualitatively similar using the stacked and balanced samples. These
results are reported in Appendix Table B.5.
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Table 4: Difference in Offense Probabilities by Ethnic Groups Within KANU
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gema (excluding Kamatusa and Luo from the sample)
Gema × Post 61 0.032 0.050 0.051 0.051
(0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Time Period
[1957,1970] [1958,1968] [1958,1968] [1958,1968]
Sample Full Stacked Balanced Balanced
Observations 28134 11700 8503 8503
Clusters 4358 1298 773 773
Kamatusa (excluding Gema and Luo from the sample)
Kamatusa × Post 64 0.026 0.024 0.014 0.022
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Time Period
[1957,1970] [1958,1968] [1958,1968] [1962,1968]
Sample Full Stacked Balanced Balanced
Observations 31909 13230 10153 8988
Clusters 4647 1394 923 1284
Luo (excluding Gema and Kamatusa from the sample (Columns 1-4)
(including only Luo, Gema and Kamatusa (Column 5)
Luo × Post 61 0.044 0.069 0.063 0.025
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028)
Luo × Post 65 -0.090
(0.032)
Time Period
[1957,1970] [1958,1968] [1958,1968] [1958,1963] [1964,1968]
Sample Full Stacked Balanced Balanced Balanced
Observations 22336 9407 8184 4464 6330
Clusters 3195 935 744 744 1266
Notes: This table presents results separately for each of the three ethnic groups and
coalitions comprising KANU between 1961 and 1970. The dependent variable is an
indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. The top, middle
and lower panel looks at changes in the behavior of policemen ethnically affiliated
to the Gema alliance, Kamatusa alliance, and Luo, respectively. The ‘full’ panel
(Column 1) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970.
The ‘stacked’ panel (Column 2) takes the union of four balanced panels around each
transition: [1958,1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the
Kamatusa transition in 1964; and [1964,1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The
balanced panel (Column 3) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958
and 1968. Column 4 reports the impact of the groups’ entry to power in a balanced
panel specific to each group. Column 5 estimates the effect of the Luo’s exit from
power. All regressions include year and individual fixed effects, and control for the
share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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insignificant placebos support the pattern in the bottom left graph of Figure 3:
while there is no statistically discernible difference in offense rates between KANU
and non-KANU policemen in the years before the first Kenyan multiparty election
in 1961, there is a clear difference thereafter.
Table 4 presents separate regressions for each of the three main ethnic groups
within KANU. Panel A, B, C shows the results for the Gema alliance, the Kamatusa
alliance, and the Luo respectively. Columns 1-3 report the results from individual
fixed effects regressions on the three different samples we use in Table 2. Column 4
reports the impact of the groups’ entry to power in a balanced panel that is specific
to each group. Finally, column 5 estimates the effect of the Luo’s exit from power.
The results confirm the patterns shown in Figure 3. Gema officers are between
3.2% and 5.1% and significantly more likely to commit offenses than non-KANU
officers after the first election. The same holds true for Kamatusa officers: upon
joining the KANU coalition in 1964, they are between 1.4% and 2.6% more likely
to commit an offense in a given year than non-KANU officers, depending on the
specification. Finally, the pattern for Luo officers is a bit more nuanced due to their
entrance and exit of power during the time period under investigation. A Luo officer
is between 2.5% and 4.4% more likely to commit an offense than non-KANU officers
between 1961 and 1965. But upon leaving the KANU coalition, their probability
of committing an offense drops by 9% compared to Gema and Kamatusa officers,
which is statistically significant at the 1%-level. Overall, these results suggest that a
behavioral shift accounts for the observed ethnic differentials in discipline. Finally,
we investigate whether the effect differs by type of offense. Figure 4 summarises the
effects, relying on an individual fixed effects regression. The increased misbehavior
is strongest for more objective acts of misconduct.25 It appears to be driven by
absenteeism and drunkenness. Effects are small for the most subjective offense
type: disobedience. In addition, we do not see an effect of the KANU treatment
on “commendable behavior”. Recorded good behavior is much rarer in our sample
than bad behavior (there are just 208 such cases; it includes for example “solving
crimes” and “arresting criminals”). It again is an outcome of which the reporting
(conditional on behavior) should be more at the discretion of the senior officers
than the reporting of bad behavior. The corresponding coefficient is insignificant,
25One caveat to this interpretation is that these types of misbehavior are also easier to observe,
and could therefore be more responsive to shocks in general.
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Figure 4: Effect of KANU power treatment on different offense outcomes
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Notes: The figure plots coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals from our main
specification with individual fixed effects in the full sample of 6784 policemen and the balanced
panel of 1206 policemen. Coefficients and confidence intervals are scaled by the sample mean of
the corresponding offense type. Unscaled regression results can be found in Appendix Table B.8.
so KANU officers do not seem to behave more “commendably”. Overall, these
results alleviate concerns of biased reporting by senior officers.
V Mechanisms
A Division and Individual Characteristics
While the fixed effect analysis of Table 2 accounts for a large set of confounding fac-
tors, the results could still capture the impact of time-varying characteristics that
correlate with ethnicity. In addition, responsiveness to the KANU power treatment
may vary with the background and assignment characteristics of policemen. Study-
ing such heterogeneous effects could help us to uncover the mechanism through
which political dominance affects behavior. This section explores the role of these
division-level and individual-level characteristics, following the empirical strategy
described in section III.A (equation 3).
First, the changing behavior observed in Table 2 could be the result of peer
effects and the assignment of KANU officers to divisions with poorer discipline after
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous Effects
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Notes: This figure shows coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence intervals from our main
specification and the full sample, interacting KANU power with one of 8 covariates, and adding
KANU-ethnicity-covariate effects as well as year-covariate effects (as described in section III.A).
The ethnic homeland, home district, ethnic dominance, rank, literacy, and schooling measures are
described in section II.B and table 1. Prior offenses is a dummy for whether the officer has
comitted any offenses before 1961. The ethnic dominance measures are standardized in the
corresponding interaction terms. Full regression results can be found in Appendix Tables B.9,
B.10, B.11, B.15, B.16, B.17, and B.22.
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Table 5: Division-Year Fixed Effects
Offense
(1) (2) (3)
KANU power 0.031 0.034 0.026
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
Division-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 41449 17882 13056
Clusters 6146 1966 1191
Notes: This table re-estimates the OLS regressions reported in Table 2 Columns 3-5, but
includes division-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offence
committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches
to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964.
The ‘full’ panel (Column 1) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970.
The ‘stacked’ panel (Column 2) takes the union of four balanced panels around each transition:
[1958,1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the Kamatusa transition
in 1964; and [1964,1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced panel (Column 3) takes
all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include individual
and division-year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Observations
without division information are dropped from the sample. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level.
1961. The police records track assignment to 30 police district divisions. Table 5
introduces police division-year fixed effects in addition to individual fixed effects.
Even in this demanding specification, using only within-division-year variation, we
find that policemen behave worse when their ethnic group holds political power
through KANU.26 Hence, division-level peer effects cannot account for the poor
performance of KANU officers.
Second, political dominance could affect the pattern of postings, and being sta-
tioned close to home or co-ethnics may matter for performance. A-priori, the effect
of serving in one’s homeland is not clear-cut. On the one hand, more leisure op-
portunities could make officers more likely to shirk. The local political power of
one’s ethnic group will also be stronger in the homelands, which could strengthen
26Division-level measures of ethnic diversity and the General Service Unit (the most political
police unit) are not driving the results (Appendix Tables B.20 and B.18), nor do they strengthen
the KANU power effect. More generally, Figure A.11 shows that our main treatment effect is very
similar across divisions – the average treatment effect is always included in the confidence intervals
around the division-specific treatment effects.
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the KANU power effect.27 On the other hand, it might make policemen keener to
keep their jobs, and serving far away from one’s home might reduce work satisfaction
(Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi, 2013).28 The upper left sub-figure of Figure 5 investigates
the role of being stationed in one’s ethnic homeland. It shows that the main treat-
ment effect is not larger for KANU officers serving in their homeland, nor driven by
time-varying or ethnicity-specific effects of serving in one’s homeland (for which we
control in the underlying specification). Similarly, the upper right sub-figure finds
no evidence of differential effects of being stationed in one’s district of birth.29
Third, the KANU effect may arise because of the numerical dominance of one’s
own ethnic group in the workplace, i.e. among officers within the police division.
The central subplots in Figure 5 test this. Neither a measure of overall numerical
strength, nor measures of dominance of one’s ethnic group among the higher officer
ranks are significant.30 There is no evidence of the opposite hypothesis either: that
officers misbehave more when they are matched to seniors from other ethnicities,
either because such a mismatch is conducive for misbehavior, or because senior
officers are more likely to report the offenses of non-co-ethnic juniors when the
latter’s ethnic group is in power. We also examine the importance of KANU-specific
peer effects, by interacting the treatment with the share of KANU officers in the
division in a given year. While the coefficient on this interaction term is positive, it
is not consistently significant.31
Finally, the bottom four plots in Figure 5 examine the role of individual charac-
teristics. A policeman’s rank does not affect the KANU power effect. It is interesting
to note that the increased offenses are not driven by lower ranks (which would imply
a negative interaction). Hence, it seems unlikely for example that KANU policemen
27The ethnic homeland variable proxies for the local political strength of an ethnic group, because
ethnicities of elected MPs closely followed the ethnic composition of constituencies already in 1963
(Hornsby, 1989).
28Being stationed in homelands could also improve interactions of the police with the local
population (Lyall, 2010). Of course, our measure of performance is strictly internal.
29The corresponding Appendix Tables B.9 and B.10 include different measures of being posted
in one’s home region – again, these cannot explain the changing behavior of KANU policemen.
30In line with the idea that dominance at the very top of the police organisation matters, we also
look at the interaction of our treatment variable with an indicator for whether the “Provincial Police
Officer” – the officer commanding a police region (combining multiple police divisions) is from the
same ethnic group. This interaction is positive, but not significant (Appendix Table B.19). We
also do not find consistent evidence for non-linearities in measures of ethnic dominance, as shown
in Appendix Table B.12.
31Results reported in Appendix Tables B.13 and B.14.
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are bullied into misbehavior by higher-level officers. In contrast, the KANU power
effect is clearly stronger for better educated policemen. We use two measures of ed-
ucational background. First, the personnel records show whether the recruit signed
or thumb-printed his service register, which is a proxy for literacy (Rachal, 1987).
We also have information about whether the policeman has any formal schooling,
which is the case for about 30% of our sample. It is possible that literate policemen
are more responsive to the KANU power treatment because they are more politi-
cally aware. Alternatively, literate policemen could have better outside options, for
real or perceived. The plausibility of outside options as a driver of shirking behavior
will be explored further in the next subsection. In the final sub-figure, we show
evidence that the KANU effect is driven by officers without prior offenses in the
pre-treatment period (1957-1960). So, our results do not appear to be driven by
bad officers getting worse.
B Promotion and Punishment
One way to rationalize the increased misconduct of KANU officers is that the po-
lice applies different disciplining standards. Members of politically powerful ethnic
groups may be punished less for misconduct, through promotion opportunities, fines,
or dismissals. We will test if these responses change when ethnic groups lose or gain
power through KANU.
In Table 6 Column 1, we test how offenses in a policeman’s career affect his
promotion prospects. In general, higher past offense rates make promotions less
likely and dismissals or resignations more likely. But there is no evidence that
KANU officers are promoted or dismissed differently, both when they do and when
they do not have an offense history. An additional offense makes promotion 1.5
and 1.7 percentage points less likely for non-KANU and KANU officers respectively,
after 1961 (column 1). So KANU officers are punished slightly more for offenses on
average, but the 0.2 percentage point difference is small and insignificant. Moreover,
the 95% confidence interval rules out a sensitivity that is 0.4 percentage points lower
for KANU officers. An additional offense increases the dismissal probability by 13
percentage points for non-KANU officers after 1961 (column 3). The 95% confidence
interval rules out that the dismissal sensitivity for KANU officers is less than 3.4
percentage points lower. Overall, the career punishments for offenses appear very
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Table 6: Career Progression Conditional on Conduct
Promotion Dismissal Resignation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative offense rate -0.015 0.129 0.014
(per year) (0.002) (0.010) (0.00’)
KANU power -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004
× Cumulative offense rate (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.019) (0.005) (0.009)
Pre 61 dummy - 0.004 0.032 0.009
× Cumulative offense rate (0.003) (0.015) (0.007)
Offense-KANU Ethnic FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Offense-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689
Clusters 6784 6784 5792 5792 5792 5792
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s past offense rate on promotion, dismissal,
and resignation probability in the full individual-year panel data of policemen serving between
1957 and 1970. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in
1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. The cumulative offense
rate is measured as the number of offenses in the past divided by tenure (number of years in
service). Offense-KANU ethnic fixed effects interact the cumulative offense rate variable with a
dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that were ever part of KANU. The outcome in Columns 1
and 2 is a rank index taking values between 0 and 3, in Columns 3 and 4 it is a dummy for
dismissal, and in Columns 5 and 6 it is a dummy for resignation. All regressions include year,
tenure, ethnic group fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
similar regardless of whether an officer’s ethnic group holds political power through
KANU. One way to reconcile these results with the increased offense probabilities
of KANU officers is through better outside options. If KANU policemen easily find
a job, e.g. benefitting from political patronage outside the police, the threat of
dismissals loses bite. They could be willing to shirk and carry the risk of dismissal.
However, the resignation results in columns 5 and 6 do not appear to confirm this
interpretation. KANU policemen are not more likely to resign voluntarily.
Finally, Table 7 analyzes punishment. The first two columns focus on fine
amounts, while the latter two columns focus on whether an officer was punished
at all (fined, reprimanded, demoted, dismissed) immediately after an offense. In
both cases, we include a comprehensive set of controls for the number and types of
offenses committed as well as officer characteristics, in order to capture differential
treatment of KANU officers. For both fine amounts and the punishment indicator,
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Table 7: Punishment
Log(Fine) Any Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KANU power 0.015 0.011 0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Ethnic group FE Yes No Yes No
Individual FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 44689 44689 44689 44689
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 6784
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s affiliation with KANU on fines and other
forms of punishment for the full sample period (1957-1970). KANU power is a time varying
variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the
Kamatusa after 1964. Log(Fine) is calculated as Log(Fine +1). All regressions include tenure
fixed effects, year fixed effects, offense type fixed effects (using the types from Figure 5), and
interactions of each offense type with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that were ever
part of KANU. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
there is no evidence of preferential treatment. The absence of favoritism in the im-
mediate punishments also mitigates the broader concern of reporting bias to some
extent. If senior officers try to make life harder for KANU groups, one would expect
them to increase punishments conditional on offenses as well. There is no evidence
of such discriminatory treatment.
VI Discussion
Based on our findings, we can rule out that the KANU effect is driven by worse
recruits entering the police force. Instead, specifications with officer fixed effects
show that individuals change their behavior when their group comes to power. The
results in Table 5 and Figure 5 indicate that the KANU effect cannot be attributed
to the place of posting or to the ethnic composition at the division level. The police
does not seem to discriminate KANU officers positively or negatively. When KANU
policemen offend, they are not promoted, dismissed, or fined differently, as shown in
Tables 6 and 7. But then, why would policemen change their behavior when their
ethnic group is in power?
If incentives for misbehavior are not internal to the police, they could still be
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external, through improved outside options.32 But, the historical context suggests
that police jobs were relatively attractive (N’Diaye, 2002; Potholm, 1969). As an
illustration, the salary of constables exceeded the one of primary school teachers even
though the latter had to fulfil strict educational requirements (Republic of Kenya,
1967). The relative attractiveness of police jobs could have insulated officers from
improved outside options. While we lack data on the job market prospects of ex-
policemen, we do observe voluntary resignations. If KANU officers fare much better
in the general labor market, we would expect them to leave the police more often.
Table 6 suggests that this did not happen. This is mild (but not conclusive) evidence
against outside career options driving our findings. An alternative explanation is
that the improved prospects for KANU officers are linked to their role in the police,
for example if they have more opportunities to participate in corrupt activities. Such
behavior could explain the increase in absenteeism, but only if policemen are willing
to trade off these earning opportunities against the risk of missing promotions or even
dismissal. It is also harder to reconcile increased drunkenness with this explanation.
One mechanism that we cannot test directly, but is consistent with all our find-
ings, is an emboldenment effect of political power. Political shocks might prime
ethnic superiority, and lead to worse discipline, even if the objective and material
incentives for such behavior do not change. It is hard to prove directly that we are
capturing the mere priming of ethnic dominance – we are naturally constrained by
our historical data. Still, the historical literature provides useful cues. The orga-
nizational continuity of the police in the early independence period was ensured in
part by British officers who kept on serving in the Kenyan police throughout the
1960s (Sinclair, 2006). This factor may explain the absence of favoritism towards
KANU within the police management. However, ethnic politics encroachad Kenyan
society at large. The historical literature is very explicit about the effects of political
power on the (self)-image of ethnic groups. Describing the Gema group in the 1960s,
Hornsby (2012, p. 258) writes: “It was now clear that the Kikuyu and to a lesser
extent their Mount Kenya neighbours in Embu and Meru were embedding a sense
of pre-eminence in their collective Kenya. There was a growing assumption of their
right to rule. Many Kikuyu believed they were smarter, more entrepreneurial and had
32To assess the potential improvement of outside options, police recruitment patterns are inter-
esting in their own right. Figure A.5 shows that the proportion of ethnic groups in the force are
unrelated to the political changes we exploit.
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suffered more under colonialism.” As for the Luo, Stubbs (2015, p. 71) describes
the impact of their exclusion from KANU in 1965 as follows: “[T]he Luo ethnic
group lost significant status among Kenyan society and soon came to be viewed as
second-class citizens.” These historical references confirm that the political changes
we study provoked effects beyond the mere adherence to the KANU party: they
altered the self-image and status of ethnic groups. Our results indicate that this
increased salience of ethnic identities affected job performance and individual behav-
ior. Interestingly, this mechanism operates in the absence of clear career incentives,
so that we can interpret this result as an emboldenment effect triggered by political
shocks.
Our preferred interpretation of the results fits well into a set of recent findings in
the literature on the economics of ethnic identitity. The 2015 World Development
Report highlights the importance of ‘mental models’ in shaping behavior (World
Bank, 2015). While mental models are often assumed to be deeply rooted, recent
work shows important behavioral effects of priming ethnic identities. For example,
in a randomized control trial in India, Hoff and Pandey (2012) find that lower-
caste school children perform worse when their caste is mentioned before taking a
test – while there is no difference in performance when identities are not primed.
Encouraging marginalized groups to contemplate positive identities has also been
shown to increase interest in antipoverty programs Cohen et al. (2009).33 In a recent
contribution, Depetris-Chauvin and Durante (2016) find that unexpected football
victories prime national identities at the expense of ethnic identities and help to
reduce conflict. Our paper adds to this literature, as it shows the costs associated
with events that prime (ethnic) political dominance.
VII External Validity
Our analysis ends in 1970. Ethnic politics continued to feature prominently in
Kenya, although under varying conditions. In 1969, Kenya became a single-party
state. After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi succeeded and the polit-
ical coalition shifted. Moi diverted resources and patronage to his own Kalenjin
ethnic group and his allies among the Luhya and coastal ethnic groups (Throup,
33See World Bank (2015) for an overview of work on priming social norms. For example, La Fer-
rara, Chong and Duryea (2012) find that exposure to soap operas in Brazil affect fertility choices.
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1993; Burgess et al., 2015). Many senior Kikuyu police officers were replaced by
members of ethnic groups loyal to Moi (Widner, 1992; Hornsby, 2012). In 1993,
Kenya returned to multi-party elections. Burgess et al. (2015) found that periods
of autocracy (1970-1992) exhibited stronger clientilistic allocation of public goods.
In our context the transition to autocracy could have amplified feelings of embold-
enment. When we extend our analysis to the 1971-1980 period the differential rates
of misconducts do not respond to these changes but remain stable (Figure A.6).
Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to put much weight on this finding. Our
sample lacks new entries of policemen after 1970, and as policemen exit, the sample
is subject to increased selection.34
The service quality of the Kenya Police Force has demonstrably detoriated over
time while ethnic discord deepened. In 2013, Kenyans perceived the police as the
most corrupt among all their state institutions, with 95% of survey respondents stat-
ing that the police “is corrupt or extremely corrupt” (Transparency International,
2013). At the same time, the police is perceived as highly inefficient in prevent-
ing and detecting crime (Anderson, 2002; Ruteere, 2011; Okia, 2011; Akech, 2005).
The failure and shortcomings of the police as well as the ethnic dimension are most
well-documented for the 2007/08 post-election ethnic clashes that followed after the
disputed victory of Kibaki over Odinga that left 1,133 dead and about 350,000 people
displaced (Waki, 2008). The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative has assessed
that “police criminality and misconduct are based on impunity” (Hills, 2009). The
period shortly after independence may have been special in that the police was still
operating under the old regime, but this shows that ethnic politics affect police
performance even in contexts where sanction mechanisms are relatively intact and
non-discriminatory.
Under which conditions would the results of our paper apply to other contexts?
The police may be exceptional compared to other bureaucracies. It is an instrument
of regime protection and therefore vulnerable to political interference (Hassan, 2017;
Hills, 2009). It may also have a distinct esprit de corps. Nevertheless, we think there
are two main scope conditions for our findings: i) security forces - or a bureaucracy
- composed of different ethnic groups , and ii) a shock in the perceived political
importance of ethnic groups. Many African countries started with an ethnic imbal-
34The sample becomes smaller and smaller. The size of our sample is 3,112 in 1960, 3,398 in
1970, and just 1,022 in 1980.
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ance in the army and police forces as a legacy of British colonial practices to recruit
among so-called “martial races” (Clayton, 1989; Hills, 2000). But even under rep-
resentative bureaucracies as documented by Franc¸ois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015),
high ethnic fractionalisation in African populations means that the first condition is
almost always met. There are also several historical accounts of “marginalization”,
i.e. the loss of political power by particular groups. Dresang (1974) reports survey
evidence for Zambia in 1967, when the Bemba ethnic group attained predominance
in the ruling party. He shows that roughly 40% of the Lozi and other small ethnic
groups in the civil service believed that they were mistreated because of their ethnic-
ity. Because there has been no preferential treatments in development expenditures
Dresang (1974) concludes that “[W]hat may be relevant (...) is the belief that Bemba
dominance exists; not the actual extent of its existence’ ’. Similarly, Brown (1999)
describes how, after a change in the ethnically based ruling party, mistrust among
ethnic groups paralised the civil service in Trinidad and Guyana. These emotive
responses to political exclusion are in line with the results we document for the
Kenyan police.
VIII Conclusions
During Kenya’s political transition, KANU emerged as the dominant political power,
absorbing or outlawing its competitors. While favoritism and political patronage
have been documented in previous research on Kenya (e.g., Burgess et al., 2015;
Kramon and Posner, 2016), our paper leverages unique data on the day-to-day
behavior of individual public servants in one of the most important public admin-
istrations: the police. Using individual records of 6,784 Kenyan policemen between
1957 and 1970, we find that after the first multiparty election in 1961 police officers
from ethnicities associated with KANU start conducting offenses at a significantly
higher rate than non-KANU officers. Investigating this result further, we show that
this is not due to selecting worse recruits or exiting of particularly good performing
officers, but due to a change in behavior of the same individuals after 1961. This
shift in behavior does not seem to be driven or strengthened by the characteristics
of the divisions in which these policemen were serving, but seems to be more promi-
nent in literate and more highly educated officers. Finding no evidence of differential
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promotion or punishment between KANU and non-KANU, we dismiss mechanisms
relying on outside options based on political patronage appointments. Instead our
findings seem to be consistent with an emboldenment effect. The emergence of eth-
nic politics influenced the behavior of those officers ethnically associated with the
ruling party.
The micro-evidence of this paper suggests that ethnic politics shape public ser-
vice provision, not just through the direct allocation of public goods, but also
through the behavior of ethnic groups within the state’s bureaucracy. This also
means that civil servants are not insulated from political shocks to the salience
of their ethnic identities. In the light of these findings, we think that the politi-
cal environment should be considered among the key determinants of bureaucratic
performance, alongside more “classical” determinants like selection, incentives, and
monitoring - the three main factors put forward by Finan, Olken and Pande (2017).
What are the policy implications of our findings? Many African countries aim
to rebuild and form the public service into a “representative bureaucracy”.35 In
practice, this invariably means in proportion to population shares of ethnicities.
Franc¸ois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) document such proportionality at higher levels
of government more generally in Africa. But, in the context of our paper, it is not
the uneven representation of different ethnic groups in the police force that drives
underperformance. It is behavioral effects triggered by political dominance. These
effects may be long-lasting. It is less straightforward to design policies that address
an emboldenment effect than policies that curb favoritism. Still, our findings could
justify targeted increases in sanctions. They could also lend support to informa-
tion campaigns that counter-balance images of ethnic superiority. Of course, such
policies are unlikely to be implemented by political parties that are organized along
ethnic lines. Hence, at a more fundamental level, our results can also be read as
an argument in favor of institutional reforms that make the political system more
inclusive.
35Article 232 of Kenya’s constitution of 2011 requires that the composition of the civil service
is representative of the country’s diversity, including Kenya’s Police and Army (Article 246/4 and
241/4).
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A Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Effective Sampling Rate
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Notes: The figure plots the effective sampling rate between 1957 and 1970. It is calculated as the
ratio of the total strength of the police force at the 31st December of each year in our sample over
the same in the underlying population. The latter was derived from Kenya’s Statistical Abstract
and includes Europeans and Asians, whereas our sample includes Africans only. The numbers of
Europeans and Asians decreased from 10% to 7% 1957-1961. Hence, the slight decrease during
this period. The sample rate is roughly 1:4. Note how stable the sampling rate is across years of
service despite of an expansion in the police force 1960-1970 of about 20%.
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Figure A.2: Ethnic Group Proportions in Police Service Registers and Kenya Police
Annual Reports 1925-1962
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Notes: The figure plots the proportion of ethnic groups in our Police Service Registers and the
underlying population drawn from the Kenya Police Annual Reports annually between 1920 and
1962. “Foreign” includes non-Kenyan Africans, mainly from Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan and Soma-
lia. “Others” includes Kenyan Africans of the many non-major ethnic groups. The Kenya Police
Annual Reports publication was discontinued after 1963.
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Figure A.3: Personnel Strength at the Provincial Level in the Sample and Underlying
Population
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Notes: The figure plots the ratio of personnel across seven police provinces in our sample over
the same in the underlying population. The latter was derived from the Kenya Police Annual
Reports (1957-1962). Figures from this source refer to police officers ranked sergeants, corporals
and constables which are overwhelmingly African ranks, hence the sampling rate is slightly higher
than what is shown in Figure A.1. The sampling rate here averages 1:3.7 (or 26%).
Figure A.4: Dismissals in the Sample and Underlying Population Over Time
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Notes: The figure plots the prevalence of dismissals in our sample of policemen and the underlying
population for each year. The prevalence was calculated as the ratio of the number of dismissals
(for misconduct, inefficient, and medically unfit) within a calendar year over the total strength at
the 31 December of each year. The data on the total police force was derived from the Kenya Police
Annual Reports (1957-1962). The Kenya Police Annual Reports publication was discontinued after
1963.
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Figure A.5: Proportions of Different Ethnic Groups Over Time
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Notes: The figure plots the proportion of Gema, Kamatusa and Luo officers in the sample for each
year between 1957 and 1970. The vertical lines indicate the three political changes exploited in
our difference-in-difference regressions.
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Figure A.6: Main Result 1950-1980
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
O
ffe
ns
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(an
nu
al)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year
KANU non-KANU
Upper 95% CI Upper 95% CI
Lower 95% CI Lower 95% CI
Notes: The figure presents the offense probability for officers affiliated ethnically with the Kenya
African National Union (KANU) and officers not ethnically affiliated with KANU between 1950
and 1980 together with their 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line indicates the first
multiparty election in 1961, which KANU won. The ethnic groups affiliated with KANU varies
over time: those are the Gema (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru) alliance throughout, the Luo until 1965,
and the Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) after 1964.
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Figure A.7: Difference in Offense Probabilities Between KANU and Non-KANU
Officers
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Notes: The figure plots the difference in offense probability between officers affiliated ethnically
with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and officers not ethnically affiliated with KANU
between 1957 and 1970 together with the 95% confidence interval. The vertical dashed line indicates
the first multiparty election in 1961, which KANU won. The ethnic groups affiliated with KANU
varies over time: those are the Gema (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru) alliance throughout, the Luo until
1965, and the Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) after 1964.
vi
Figure A.8: Difference in Offense Probabilities Between Gema and Non-KANU
Officers
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Notes: The figure plots the difference in offense probability between Gema officers and officers
that were never ethnically affiliated with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) together
with their 95% confidence interval. The vertical dashed line indicates the first multiparty election
in 1961, which KANU won.
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Figure A.9: Difference in Offense Probabilities Between Kamatusa and Non-KANU
Officers
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Notes: The figure plots the difference in offense probability between Kamatusa officers and officers
that were never ethnically affiliated with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) together
with their 95% confidence interval. The vertical line marks the Kamatusa gaining political power
through the incorporation of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) into KANU in 1964.
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Figure A.10: Difference in Offense Probabilities Between Luo and Non-KANU Of-
ficers
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Notes: The figure plots the difference in offense probability between Luo officers and officers that
were never ethnically affiliated with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) together with
their 95% confidence interval. The first vertical line indicates the first multiparty election in 1961,
which KANU won, and the second vertical like marks the Luo’s split from KANU and loss of
political power in 1965.
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Figure A.11: Division Heterogeneity
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Notes: The figure plots division-specific effects together with their 95% confidence interval, as in
Table 5 for the full sample. The dashed horizontal line indicates the average treatment effect.
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B Additional Tables
A Additional Tables to the Main Results
Table B.1: Pre-Independence Differences Between KANU and Other Groups
(1) (2) (3)
KANU ethnic Other groups T-stat (2)-(1)
Offense indicator 0.19 0.19 0.35
Maximum tenure 6.43 6.93 3.21
Maximum rank index (0-3) 0.18 0.22 2.12
Literacy (signed booklet) 0.23 0.24 0.44
Any schooling 0.18 0.12 -4.61
Observations 2075 1976
Notes: The table presents pre-independence averages on key variables for
police officers ethnically affiliated with the Kenya African National Union
(KANU) at any time between 1957 and 1970 (i.e., Gema, Kamatusa, and
Luo) and police officers from other ethnic groups never affiliated with KANU.
Observations are at the police-year level (time-varying characteristics are av-
eraged over this period). Literacy is approximated by whether the individual
has signed his personnel booklet versus given a thumbprint. The number of
observations reported do not reflect missing values for individual variables.
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Table B.2: Difference in Offense Probabilities between KANU and Non-KANU Of-
ficers, 1950-1980
Offense
(1) (2) (3)
KANU ethnic -0.005
(0.005)
KANU power 0.042 0.041 0.034
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Ethnic Group FE No Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes
Observations 85003 85003 85003
Notes: This table reports the effect of a police-
man’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense
probabilities for the extended time period 1950-
1980. The dependent variable is an indicator for
any offense committed by a policeman in a given
year. KANU ethnic is a time invariant dummy
variable taking the value 1 for ethnic groups that
were part of KANU (Luo, Kamatusa, and Gema).
KANU power is a time varying variable that
switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo
between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after
1964. The sample includes all policemen in the
sample serving between 1950 and 1980. All re-
gressions include year fixed effects, and control
for the share of the year served. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.3: Difference in the Number of Offenses between KANU and Non-KANU
Officers
Number of Offenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Regression Results
KANU ethnic 0.003
(0.009)
KANU power 0.061 0.056 0.049 0.047 0.043***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Ethnic Group Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44689 44689 44689 18567 13266
Poisson Regression Results
KANU ethnic 0.008
(0.039)
KANU power 0.234 0.222 0.233 0.264 0.248***
(0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.069) (0.076)
Ethnic Group FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44689 44689 31655 12940 9251
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on the
number of offenses using OLS and Poisson regression models. The dependent variable is a
count of the number of offenses committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU ethnic
is a time invariant dummy variable taking the value 1 for ethnic groups that were part of
KANU (Luo, Kamatusa, and Gema). KANU power is a time varying variable that switches
to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964.
The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957
and 1970. The stacked panel (Column 4) takes the union of four balanced panels around
each transition: [1958,1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the
Kamatusa transition in 1964; and [1964,1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced
panel (Column 5) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All
regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.4: Placebo Regressions (Full Sample)
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU × Year 60 0.009
(0.018)
KANU × Year 59-60 0.003
(0.014)
KANU × Year 58-60 -0.009
(0.013)
KANU power 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.030
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
KANU power 0.000
(1 year forward) (0.012)
KANU power -0.001
(2 year forward) (0.010)
KANU power 0.003
(3 year forward) (0.010)
Wald Test
KANU power - Placebo 0.020 0.026 0.035 0.028 0.028 0.027
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 6784 6784 6784
Notes: This table presents the results from placebo regression models for the
full individual-year panel data of policemen serving between 1957 and 1970. The
dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in
a given year. The models in Columns 1-3 use time-indicator placebos interacted
with KANU membership, equal to one from 1957 onwards for Luo and Gema,
thus testing for significant pre-treatment differences for the ethnic groups that
compromise KANU in 1961 between 1 and 3 years before the dominant role of
KANU takes effect in 1961. The models in Columns 4-6 shift the KANU power
variable 1, 2 and 3 years forward. KANU power is a time varying variable that
switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the
Kamatusa after 1964. All regressions include year and individual fixed effects, and
control for share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
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Table B.5: Placebo Regressions (Stacked and Balanced Panels)
Offense (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stacked Panels
KANU × Placebo 60 0.006
(0.025)
KANU × Placebo 59-60 -0.007
(0.019)
KANU × Placebo 58-60 -0.011
(0.019)
KANU power 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.036 0.043
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
KANU power 0.001
(1 year forward) (0.015)
KANU power 0.007
(2 year forward) (0.013)
KANU power 0.015
(3 year forward)
(0.013)
Wald Test 0.027 0.039 0.041 0.032 0.029 0.028
KANU power - Placebo (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 18567 18567 18567 18567 18567 18567
Balanced Panel
KANU × Placebo 60 0.003
(0.025)
KANU × Placebo 59-60 -0.011
(0.019)
KANU × Placebo 58-60 -0.017
(0.019)
KANU power 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.030 0.031 0.037
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
KANU power 0.014
(1 year forward) (0.017)
KANU power 0.010
(2 year forward) (0.013)
KANU power 0.016
(3 year forward)
(0.013)
Wald Test 0.024 0.036 0.039 0.015 0.021 0.021
KANU power - Placebo (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 13266 13266 13266 13266 13266 13266
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in
a given year. The models in Columns 1-3 use time-indicator placebos interacted with KANU
membership, equal to one from 1957 onwards for Luo and Gema, thus testing for significant
pre-treatment differences for the ethnic groups that compromise KANU in 1961 between 1 and
3 years before the dominant role of KANU takes effect in 1961. The models in Columns 4-6 shift
the KANU power variable 1, 2 and 3 years forward. KANU power is a time varying variable
that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa
after 1964. The stacked panel takes the union of four balanced panels around each transition:
[1958,1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the Kamatusa transition
in 1964; and [1964,1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced panel takes all policemen
serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include year and individual fixed
effects, and control for share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. xv
Table B.6: Difference in Offense Probabilities between KANU and Non-KANU Of-
ficers - no control
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KANU ethnic -0.001
(0.006)
KANU power 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Ethnic Group FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44689 44689 44689 18567 13266
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 2053 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU
on offense probabilities without year fixed effects and the share of the year served.
The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman
in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1
for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa
after 1964. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample
serving between 1957 and 1970. The stacked panel (Column 4) takes the union
of four balanced panels around each transition: [1958,1968] for the Gema and
Luo transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the Kamatusa transition in 1964; and
[1964,1968] for the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced panel (Column 5) takes
all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.7: Main Results with Reweighted Kamba
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KANU ethnic 0.001
(0.006)
KANU power 0.038 0.035 0.028 0.033 0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Ethnic Group FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44689 44689 44689 18567 13266
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 2053 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU
on offense probabilities re-weighted for the Kamba oversampling. The dependent
variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year.
KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961,
for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. The full panel
(Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and
1970. The stacked panel (Column 4) takes the union of four balanced panels
around each transition: [1958,1968] for the Gema and Luo transition in 1961;
[1962,1968] for the Kamatusa transition in 1964; and [1964,1968] for the Luo
transition in 1965. The balanced panel (Column 5) takes all policemen serving
continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects,
and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
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Table B.8: Offense Types and Commendable Behavior
Offense Absent Drunk Serious Offense Dirty Disobedient Commendable
Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample:
KANU power 0.028 0.015 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Mean DV 0.192 0.077 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.004
Observations 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689 44689
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 6784 6784 6784 6784
Balanced Sample [1958,1968]:
KANU power 0.027 0.014 0.008 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Mean DV 0.134 0.047 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.006
Observations 13266 13266 13266 13266 13266 13266 13266
Clusters 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense probabilities of
different types for the full and balanced panels of policemen as reported in Figure 4. All coefficients are scaled
by the sample mean of the corresponding offense type. The dependent variable is an indicator for a (specific)
offense committed by a policeman in a given year (Columns 1-6) or whether their behavior was commended
(Column 7). KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo
between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. The full panel includes all policemen in the sample
serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and
1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
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B Additional Tables on Potential Mechanisms
Table B.9: Homelands
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.021 0.021
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Homeland 0.001 -0.016
(0.012) (0.018)
KANU power 0.006 -0.001
× Homeland (0.023) (0.032)
Homeland - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Homeland - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 41449 41449 41449 13056 13056 13056
Clusters 6146 6146 6146 1191 1191 1191
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense
probabilities distinguishing between whether an officer serves in a division that is stationed in
his ethnic homeland or not for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an
indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time
varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for
the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power × Homeland is the multiplicative interaction between
the homeland indicator and the KANU power dummy variable. The full panel (Columns 1-
3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel
(Columns 4-6) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions
include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.10: Serving in Home Division
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance between village of birth and police division of service
KANU power 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.037 0.035 0.036
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log(distance) 0.008 0.000 0.011
(0.005) (0.008)
KANU power -0.015 -0.024
× Log(distance) (0.011) (0.015)
Distance - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Distance - Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 25749 25749 25749 7644 7644 7644
Clusters 3899 3899 3899 697 697 697
Serving in ‘home’ police division based on district of birth
KANU power 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.027 0.025 0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Home division -0.024 -0.012
(0.013) (0.020)
KANU power -0.014 0.030
× Home division (0.028) (0.040)
Home division - KANU Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Home division - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 39653 39653 39653 12539 12539 12539
Clusters 5885 5885 5885 1144 1144 1144
Serving in ‘home’ police division based on district of registration
KANU power 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.021 0.021 0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Home division -0.025 -0.032
(0.015) (0.022)
KANU power -0.025 -0.001
× Home division (0.028) (0.035)
Home division - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Home division - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 31827 31827 31827 10379 10379 10379
Clusters 4341 4341 4341 947 947 947
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense proba-
bilities distinguishing between whether an officer served in his ethnic homeland or not using different
measures for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense
committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1
for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. The top panel
interacts KANU power with Log(distance) a standardized measure of distance between the centroid
of the division in which an officer served and the centroid of his ethnic homeland. KANU × Home
division is a multiplicative interaction term between the ‘home’ police division indicator, defined by
birth district (middle panel) or registration district (bottom panel), and the KANU power dummy
variable. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and
1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and
1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.11: Ethnic Dominance in Division
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.025 0.033 0.028
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Ethnic share in division 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.007)
KANU power -0.010 -0.028
× Ethnic share in division (0.011) (0.015)
Ethnic share - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Ethnic share - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 40439 40439 40439 12660 12660 12660
Clusters 5992 5992 5992 1155 1155 1155
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense
probabilities distinguishing between whether an officer serves in a division dominated by his ethnic
group or not for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an indicator for any
offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that
switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after
1964. KANU power × Ethnic share in division is the multiplicative interaction between the
ethnic division share and the KANU power dummy variable. The ethnic share is standardized at
its mean. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957
and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes all policemen serving continuously between
1958 and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year
served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.12: Ethnic Dominance in Division - by Quartile
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KANU power 0.037 0.036 0.044 0.020
× Ethnic share in division Q1 (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.024)
KANU power 0.038 0.040 0.058 0.028
× Ethnic share in division Q2 (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
KANU power 0.026 0.030 0.019 0.035
× Ethnic share in division Q3 (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023)
KANU power 0.003 0.019 -0.028 0.024
× Ethnic share in division Q4 (0.024) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020)
Ethnicity-specific quartiles No Yes No Yes
Test Q1-Q4 (p-value) 0.26 0.45 0.08 0.89
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample
Observations 40439 40439 12660 12660
Clusters 5592 5592 1155 1155
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation
with KANU on offense probabilities distinguishing between whether
an officer serves in a division dominated by his ethnic group (by quar-
tiles) or not for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable
is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given
year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for
the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Ka-
matusa after 1964. Unlike in Table B.11 ethnic share is not included
as a continuous measure but in terms of quartile indicators to assess
potential non-linearities in the effect multiplied by the KANU power
indicator. The underlying ethnic share is standardized at its mean
before ordered and divided into quartile indicators. The full panel
(Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between
1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes all police-
men serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions
include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.13: KANU Dominance in Division
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.030 0.030 0.034 0.026 0.022 0.029
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
KANU share in division -0.009 0.002
(0.007) (0.010)
KANU power 0.016 0.039
× KANU share in division (0.012) (0.017)
Ethnic share - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Ethnic share - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 40439 40439 40439 12660 12660 12660
Clusters 5992 5992 5992 1155 1155 1155
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense
probabilities distinguishing between whether an officer serves in a division dominated by KANU
affiliated ethnic groups or not for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an
indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time
varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for
the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power × KANU share in division is the multiplicative interaction
between the KANU affiliated ethnic division share and the KANU power dummy variable. The
ethnic share is standardized at its mean. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in
the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes all policemen
serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control
for the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.14: KANU Dominance in Division - by Quartile
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KANU power 0.034 0.017 0.017 -0.006
× KANU share in division Q1 (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.026)
KANU power 0.019 0.027 0.013 0.009
× KANU share in division Q2 (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022)
KANU power 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.045
× KANU share in division Q3 (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
KANU power 0.038 0.038 0.049 0.044
× KANU share in division Q4 (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
KANU-specific quartiles No Yes No Yes
Test Q1-Q4 (p-value) 0.87 0.38 0.38 0.15
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample
Observations 40439 40439 12660 12660
Clusters 5592 5592 1155 1155
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation
with KANU on offense probabilities distinguishing between whether
an officer serves in a division dominated by KANU affiliated ethnic
groups (by quartiles) or not for the full and balanced sample. The
dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a po-
liceman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that
switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965,
and for the Kamatusa after 1964. Unlike in Table B.13 KANU share
in division is not included as a continuous measure but in terms of
quartile indicators to assess potential non-linearities in the effect mul-
tiplied by the KANU power indicator. The underlying ethnic share
is standardized at its mean before ordered and divided into quar-
tile indicators. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen
in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel
(Columns 4-6) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958
and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for
the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
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Table B.15: Ethnic Dominance in Higher Ranks
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senior: Corporal or higher
KANU power 0.028 0.029 0.040 0.027 0.028 0.044
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
Ethnic senior share 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
KANU power -0.011 -0.014
× Ethnic senior share (0.008) (0.011)
Senior: Sergeant or higher
KANU power 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.021 0.022 0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Ethnic senior share 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
KANU power -0.004 0.007
× Ethnic senior share (0.008) (0.010)
Senior Share - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Senior Share - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 41415 41415 41415 13042 13042 13042
Clusters 6146 6146 6146 1191 1191 1191
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU
on offense probabilities distinguishing between whether an officer serves in a division
dominated by senior officers of KANU affiliated ethnic groups or not using two dif-
ferent operationalizations of ‘senior’ (top panel: corporal or higher; bottom panel:
sergeant or higher) for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an
indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is
a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between
1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power × Ethnic senior share
is the multiplicative interaction between the proportion of senior officers of KANU
affiliated ethnic groups and the KANU power dummy variable. The ethnic share is
standardized at its mean. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in
the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes
all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include
year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.16: Rank
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.024
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Rank -0.016 -0.009
(0.009) (0.012)
KANU power -0.010 0.004
× Rank (0.012) (0.015)
Rank - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Rank - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 44689 44689 44689 13266 13266 13266
Clusters 6784 6784 6784 1206 1206 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on of-
fense probabilities distinguishing by rank for the full and balanced sample. The dependent
variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU
power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo
between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power × Rank is the multi-
plicative interaction between the rank index and the KANU power dummy variable. The
full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and
1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes all policemen serving continuously between
1958 and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the
year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.17: Signed Booklet (Versus Thumbprint) and Years of Schooling
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
KANU power 0.026 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.019 0.010 0.023 0.006
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
KANU power 0.046 0.054
× Literate (0.020) (0.031)
KANU power 0.030 0.025
× Schooling (0.021) (0.036)
KANU power 0.028 0.053
× Schooling/Literate (0.017) (0.023)
Education - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Education - Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 38917 38917 44689 44689 11176 11176 13266 13266
Clusters 5943 5943 6784 6784 1016 1016 1206 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense probabilities distinguishing
by two different operationalizations of education for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an indicator
for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1
for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power × Schooling is
the multiplicative interaction between the schooling indicator, capturing whether an officer had completed any formal
schooling (primary, secondary, vocational), and the KANU power dummy variable. KANU power × Literate is the
multiplicative interaction between an literacy indicator (whether an officer signed or thumb printed his booklet) and
the KANU power dummy variable. The full panel (Columns 1-4) includes all policemen in the sample serving between
1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 5-8) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All
regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
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Table B.18: Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.027
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF) -0.067 0.073
(0.086) (0.117)
KANU power × ELF 0.073 0.262
(0.226) (0.317)
ELF - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
ELF - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 41449 41449 41449 13056 13056 13056
Clusters 6146 6146 6146 1191 1191 1191
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense
probabilities by different levels of ethnic linguistic fractionalization (ELF) for the full and
balanced sample. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a
policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the
Gema in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power
× ELF is the multiplicative interaction between the ELF of the police division and officer is
stationed and the KANU power dummy variable. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all
policemen in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6)
takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include year
fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
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Table B.19: Regional Commander Match
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KANU power 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Regional Commander match -0.034 -0.048 -0.001 -0.010
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
KANU power 0.036 0.058
× Regional Commander match (0.030) (0.068)
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 44689 44689 13266 13266
Clusters 6784 6784 1206 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU
on offense probabilities distinguishing by whether there is an ethnic match between
the officer and his regional commander or not in the full and balanced sample. The
dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman in a
given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema
in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU
power × Regional Commander match is the multiplicative interaction between the
indicator capturing whether the ethnicity of the officer and his regional commander
matches (there are 8 regions, above the division level) or not and the KANU
power dummy variable. The full panel (Columns 1-2) includes all policemen in the
sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 3-4) takes
all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include
year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.20: General Service Unit
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KANU power 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
GSU 0.011 0.001
(0.015) (0.025)
KANU power × GSU 0.023 -0.035
(0.039) (0.062)
GSU - KANU Ethnic Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
GSU - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 41449 41449 41449 13056 13056 13056
Clusters 6146 6146 6146 1191 1191 1191
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on
offense probabilities distinguishing by membership in the General Service Unit (GSU),
the paramilitary wing of the National Police Serice of Kenya, for the full and balanced
sample. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed by a policeman
in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema
in 1961, for the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power
× GSU is the multiplicative interaction between the GSU indicator and the KANU power
dummy variable. The full panel (Columns 1-3) includes all policemen in the sample serving
between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 4-6) takes all policemen serving
continuously between 1958 and 1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control
for the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.21: Personal Characteristics: height and children
Offense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
KANU power 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.035 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.026 0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
KANU power -0.001 0.002
× Height (0.002) (0.003)
Any children -0.020 0.000
(0.013) (0.022)
KANU power -0.021 0.006
× Any children (0.018) (0.023)
Height - Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Any children - No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
KANU Ethnic Effects
Any Children - Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 42392 42392 44689 44689 44689 12584 12584 13266 13266 13266
Clusters 6398 6398 6784 6784 6784 1144 1144 1206 1206 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on offense probabilities distinguishing by personal
characteristics (i.e., height and children) for the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an indicator for any offense committed
by a policeman in a given year. KANU power is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between
1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU power × Any Children is the multiplicative interaction between the indicator of
whether a policeman had any children and the KANU power dummy variable. KANU power × Height is the multiplicative interaction term
between a policeman’s hight (in centimetres) and the KANU power dummy variable. The full panel (Columns 1-5) includes all policemen in
the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel (Columns 6-10) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and
1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
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Table B.22: Results by Type of Offender
Offense
(1) (2)
KANU power - 0.010 -0.009
(0.015) (0.019)
KANU power 0.045 0.050
× No offenses 1957-1960 (0.018) (0.022)
Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample [1958,1968]
Observations 44689 13266
Clusters 6784 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a policeman’s ethnic affiliation
with KANU on offense probabilities distinguishing by offender type for
the full and balanced sample. The dependent variable is an indicator
for any offense committed by a policeman in a given year. KANU power
is a time varying variable that switches to 1 for the Gema in 1961, for
the Luo between 1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964. KANU
power× No offenses 1957-1970 is the multiplicative interaction between
the dummy variable indicating whether a policeman has committed at
least one previous offense between 1957 and 1970 and the KANU power
dummy variable. The full panel (Column 1) includes all policemen
in the sample serving between 1957 and 1970. The balanced panel
(Column 2) takes all policemen serving continuously between 1958 and
1968. All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the share
of the year served. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table B.23: Decay
Offense
(1) (2) (3)
KANU power 0.030 0.037 0.024
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
KANU power -0.006 -0.015 0.009
× Post 1967 (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
Sample Full Stacked Balanced
Observations 44689 18567 13266
Clusters 6784 2053 1206
Notes: This table reports the effect of a po-
liceman’s ethnic affiliation with KANU on of-
fense probabilities and whether the effect de-
creases over time for the full, stacked and bal-
anced panel samples. The dependent variable
is an indicator for any offense committed by
a policeman in a given year. KANU power
is a time varying variable that switches to 1
for the Gema in 1961, for the Luo between
1961-1965, and for the Kamatusa after 1964.
KANU power × Post 1967 is the multiplica-
tive interaction between the post 1967 indi-
cator and the KANU power dummy variable.
The full panel (Column 1) includes all police-
men in the sample serving between 1957 and
1970. The stacked panel (Column 4) takes
the union of four balanced panels around each
transition: [1958,1968] for the Gema and Luo
transition in 1961; [1962,1968] for the Kama-
tusa transition in 1964; and [1964,1968] for
the Luo transition in 1965. The balanced
panel (Column 3) takes all policemen serv-
ing continuously between 1958 and 1968. All
regressions include year fixed effects, and con-
trol for the share of the year served. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
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